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Liepas: Water Law - Discrimination against Interstate Commerce in Ground
WATER LAW-Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce In Ground Water
for Economic Reasons. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379
(D.N.M. 1983).
In 1980 the City of El Paso filed suit challenging New Mexico's embargo of ground water as unconstitutional under the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution.1 El Paso needed ground water from New
Mexico in order to meet the water demand of its citizens. El Paso filed applications with the State Engineer of New Mexico for permits to appropriate ground water. The applications were denied because the State
Engineer interpreted the state constitution to preclude the export of
ground water beyond the state's borders. 2 El Paso brought suit challenging
3
the constitutionality of section 72-12-19 of the New Mexico Statutes (embargo statute) as well as all other aspects of New Mexico law that were
causing the embargo of ground water.' The United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico sustained the challenge and held the statute
to be unconstitutional (El Paso 1).5 The court interpreted Sporhase v.
Nebraska6 to hold that discrimination by a state against interstate commerce in ground water in excess of the amount necessary for the protection
of health and safety was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. 7 New
Mexico appealed the district court's decision.8 The New Mexico Legislature
then repealed the embargo statute and in its place enacted section 72-12B-1
(Senate Bill 295) of the New Mexico Statutes. 9 The new statute allows for
the movement of ground water beyond the state's borders and establishes a
procedure for the granting of permits for the export of water. 10 After the
new statute was enacted, New Mexico moved in the appellate court to have
the case dismissed. 1 New Mexico claimed that the new statute mooted the
issue between the parties.' 2 The appellate court vacated the decision in El
PasoI and remanded the case to the district court for "fresh consideration
there of the respective rights and obligations of the parties in light of
whatever intervening changes of law and circumstances are relevant" (El
Paso I1).13 This Note will deal primarily with the commerce clause aspects
of the controversy.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 381 (D.N.M. 1983).
3. In pertinent part the statute reads as follows: No person shall withdraw water from any
underground source in New Mexico for use in any other state by drilling a well in New
Mexico and transporting the water outside the state or by drilling a well outside the boundaries of New Mexico and pumping water from under lands lying within the boundaries of
New Mexico; provided that nothing in this act prohibits the transportation of water by
tank truck from an underground source in New Mexico to any other state where the
water is used for exploration and drilling for oil and g....
The amount of water
withdrawn from any one well for such exploration shall never exceed three acre-feet.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978).
4. Plaintiff's First Amended and Supplemental Complaint at 1, City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
No. 83-1350 (10th Cir., 1983).
5. 563 F. Supp. at 392.
6. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
7. Id. at 389.
8. Appellant's Docketing Statement at 2, City of El Paso v. Reynolds, No. 83-1350 (10th
Cir., 1983).
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (1978) (Supp. 1983).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-l(AXG) (Supp. 1983).
11. Motion to Dismiss and Suggestion of Mootness at 2, City of El Paso v. Reynolds, No.
83-1350 (10th Cir., 1983).
12. Id. at3.
13. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, No. 83-1350, Order and Judgment at 3 (10th Cir., 1983).
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BACKGROUND

Many states have enacted legislation to prevent or restrict the flow of
goods and resources across their state lines. State quarantine and inspection laws restrict the flow of goods into a state for the purpose of protecting the health and safety of the state's citizens. 14 Other laws, however,
have been motivated solely by a desire to gain an economic advantage for
the citizens of one state at the expense of interstate commerce and citizens
of other states.' 5 Quarantine and inspection laws have been upheld as a
valid exercise of police power. A key feature of these laws is that they
discriminate against all commerce in the item sought to be controlled and
not just the interstate portion. Statutes by which a state has attempted to
for its citizens have generally failed to survive
gain an economic advantage
16
constitutional scrutiny.
When state regulations involving water have been challenged on commerce clause grounds, the states have commonly relied on three general
theories to defend their laws: (1) water is not an article of commerce; (2)
Congress has authorized the states to impose these burdens on interstate
commerce; and (3) the state is the owner of the resource and the state's
decision regarding the resource is a valid exercise of its police power.
All three of these theories were addressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska." First, Nebraska argued that
ground water should not be considered an article of commerce because of
the severe restrictions placed on ownership by the state. The Court rejected Nebraska's argument on the ground that acceptance of that contention would exempt state water laws from scrutiny under the commerce
clause and would curtail Congress' ability to act in this area.' The Court
then held that water is an article of commerce. 19
Second, Nebraska argued that congressional deference to state water
laws puts those regulations beyond the reach of the commerce clause. The
Court in Sporhase held that deference by Congress did not "constitute persuasive evidence that Congress consented to the unilateral imposition of
unreasonable burdens on commerce" 20 and that compliance with the commerce clause is a necessary element of a "valid state law to which Congress
has deferred."'"
14. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (New York regulation requiring cattle to be certified free of Bang's disease); Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217 (1889) (Iowa statute that held
possessor of diseased cattle liable for damages caused by the spread of the disease); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (Minnesota statute banning the
sale of milk in plastic containers).
15. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (Municipal ordinances regulating
the sale of milk and milk products within its jurisdiction); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North Carolina statute regulating the
grading of apples imported into the state); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978) (New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of waste into the state).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17. 458 U.S. 941, 945-51 (1982).
18. Id. at 953.
19. Id. at 954.
20. Id. at 960.
21. Id.
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Third, the state in Sporhase argued that ground water is owned by the
state and regulations dealing with ground water are beyond scrutiny under
the commerce clause. 22 The same argument had been presented in City of
Altus v. Carrand rejected.23 In Altus, Texas argued that the surface owner
could not obtain absolute ownership of the ground water he pumped from
his land and the ownership rights he did not obtain remained in the state. In
Sporhase, Nebraska argued that since it imposed greater restrictions on
ground water than did Texas in Altus, its regulation should not be subject
to the commerce clause. 24 The Court in Sporhase rejected this contention,
stating that: "although appellee's greater ownership interest may not be irrelevant to commerce clause analysis, it does not absolutely remove
Nebraska ground water from such scrutiny. For appellee's argument is still
based on the legal fiction of state ownership." 25 By later adding that
Nebraska's claim to public ownership of water "is not without
significance" in a commerce clause inquiry, it appears that the state ownership argument retains some vitality.2 6 But a state's ability to regulate the
use of ground water through its police power remains viable after
Sporhase. In fact, Mr. Justice Stevens wrote that "a state's power to
regulate the use of water in times and places of shortage for the purpose of
protecting the health of its citizens-and not
simply the health of its
27
economy-is at the core of its police power."
After the decision in Sporhase, any attempt to justify restrictions on
the interstate movement of ground water on the theory ground water is not
an article of commerce would be futile at best. The Court specifically stated
that water is an article of commerce and that Congress has not removed
commerce clause constraints from state regulation in this area.28 The
theory of state ownership of ground water resources appears to be weakened by the decision in Sporhase. It is interesting to note that the Court was
careful not to completely negate the state ownership theory. Questions still
remain as to when "significance" will be accorded the "legal fiction of state
ownership" and the extent of the significance. 29 Finally, the police power
theory remains a viable basis for the regulation of ground water. But, attempts by states to regulate water under police power will still be subject to
scrutiny under the commerce clause.30
The state's interest in providing safe and adequate supplies of water
for its people cannot be questioned. Water, in addition to being crucial to
the existence of life, is also a necessary ingredient for the maintenance of
economic activity. A state also has an interest in promoting economic
growth and well being for its citizens.3 ' The federal government has an interest in promoting interstate commerce by preventing undue restrictions
from being imposed upon it. This is the juncture at which state and federal
interests collide.
22. Id. at 949-51.
23. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), affd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
24. 458 U.S. at 951.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 953.
27. Id. at 956.
28. Id. at 954, 958-60.
29. Id. at 951-53.
30. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-70 (1945).
31. Chicago, B. and Q. Ry. Co. v. illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
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EL PASO I-THE CouRT's ANALYSIS
As mentioned earlier, the defendants in El Paso I argued that: (1)
water is not an article of commerce and therefore the statute is not subject
to commerce clause analysis; (2) Congress has permitted the states to impose burdens on interstate commerce in ground water; and (3) the state's
exercise of police power over publicly owned resources is beyond the reach
of the commerce clause. S2 The district court disposed of the defendant's
contentions in short order, relying on Sporhase.8 The district court held
that water is an article of commerce and that "Congress' long-standing
deference to state water law did not demonstrate an intent to permit
discrimination against interstate commerce in ground water. 8 4 The court
also held that federal constitutional constraints are not surrendered
because the state claims public ownership of the resource. 8 The district
court added that "although such a claim may support a limited preference
for its own citizens in the utilization of the resource. ..,a state's asserted
ownership of public waters within the state is only a legal fiction." 86
Having disposed of these defenses, the district court then proceeded to
analyze the statute under traditional commerce clause analysis. First,
because the statute called for almost a total ban on exports of water the
court found the statute to be facially discriminatory and therefore subject
to strict scrutiny. 7 Even though the court recognized the need for strict
scrutiny, it apparently analyzed the statute according to the test used for a
slightly lower level of scrutiny. For a discriminatory statute to survive commerce clause scrutiny, according to the Court in El Paso I, the proponent
must show that the embargo is necessary to further a legitimate local purpose, is narrowly tailored to that purpose and that no other nondiscriminatory alternatives exist.8 8
The state claimed its embargo was intended to "conserve and preserve
the state's internal water supply."8s9 The district court found this purpose
to be "unquestionably legitimate and highly important" 40 and that it might
justify limited non-discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce but it
could not "support a total ban on interstate transportation of ground
water." 41 The district court then distinguished between regulations intended to further public health and safety considerations and those intended to
promote economic protectionism. This distinction gives a state the power'2
"to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety" but
not "to retard, burden or constrict the flow of ... commerce for
their economic advantage.. ." Thus the Supreme Court held that a
31. Chicago, B. and Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
32. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 388 (D.N.M. 1983).
33. Id.

34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id.(citations omitted from quoted material).
37. Id. at 388-92.
38. Id. at 388.
39. Id. at 389.

40. Id
41. Id.
42. Id.(citations omitted from quoted material).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss2/6
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state may discriminate in favor of its citizens only to the extent
that water is essential to human survival. Outside of fulfilling
human survival needs, water is an economic resource. For purposes of constitutional analysis under the Commerce Clause, it is to
be treated the same as other natural resources.
The defendants argued that by the year 2020 the state's water supply
will be insufficient to meet "reasonable 'public welfare' needs" and that
statewide shortages of 626,000 acre-feet of water per year will occur. 43 The
district court found that in determining "public welfare needs" the defendants were including estimated needs for industry, energy production, and
irrigated agriculture." By restricting interstate commerce in ground
water for the purpose of furthering these non-health and non-safety needs
the court felt New Mexico
was engaging in an activity "tantamount to
' 45
economic protectionism.

EL PASO I-CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS
A. General Observations
By holding the embargo statute unconstitutional, the district court's
decision in El Paso I was correct. The statute sought to discriminate
against interstate commerce under the guise of "conservation." The facts
demonstrated, however, that there was no shortage of water for meeting
the health and safety needs of the people. More specifically, the court found
that the statewide demand for water in New Mexico for health and safety
reasons was about 220,000 acre-feet per year whereas the estimated
renewable supply of water was ten times that amount.4 6 The State
Engineer also admitted that the time when the scarcity of water would
become a limitation on the growth of the state was still far away. 47 Also included in the court's analysis was a recognition that interstate commerce
was bearing the brunt of the burden from this conservation effort. The
Court in Sporhase found it significant that Nebraska's regulatory scheme
imposed restrictions on intrastate as well as interstate commerce in
water. 48 The Court in Sporhase felt that "a state that imposes severe
withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating
against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled
transfer of water out of the state. An exemption for interstate transfers
'49
would be inconsistent with the ideal of evenhandedness in regulation."
Such balanced regulation did not exist in New Mexico. Additionally, the
district court found that even if the embargo statute was only for the purpose of protecting the health and safety of the state's citizens it would be
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.5" The defendants were unable to "marshall evidence to establish a
43. Id. at 389-90.
44. Id. at 390.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 389.
47. Id. at 390.
48. 458 U.S. at 955-56.
49. Id.
50. 563 F. Supp. 379, 390 (D.N.M. 1983).
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close means-end relationship between even a total ban on the exportation
of water and a purpose to conserve and preserve water." 1
B. Sporhase and Regulation of Ground Waterfor Economic Reasons
The district court in El PasoI interpreted Sporhase to preclude a state
from discriminating against interstate commerce in ground water in excess
of the amount necessary for the health and safety needs of its citizens. 52 In
so doing, however, the court interpreted the decision in Sporhase too
narrowly.
In Sporhase, the appellants were challenging the constitutionality of a
Nebraska statute which required them to obtain a permit from the Director
of Water Resources before removing ground water from the state. 53 Appellants owned adjoining tracts of land situated in Nebraska and
Colorado.54 They wanted to use water from a well located on tracts in
Nebraska for irrigation of land in Colorado."
The Court in Sporhase focused its attention on four aspects of the
Nebraska statute under attack. 6 The first three specified the conditions
upon which the Director of Water Resources would grant a permit to export ground water. In order to grant a permit the Director had to find that:
(a) the proposed withdrawal of ground water was reasonable; (b) the
withdrawal of ground water was not contrary to conservation efforts and
the use of ground water; and, (c) the requested withdrawal was not
othrwise detrimental to the public welfare.5 7 The Court found that these
aspects of the statute did not "impermissibly burden interstate
commerce." 58 The fourth aspect of the statute was a reciprocity requirement. Under the reciprocity requirement the state that was to receive
Nebraska groundwater had to grant reciprocal rights for the export of
ground water to Nebraska.59 The Court in Sporhase found there was no
relationship, under the facts of the case, between the reciprocity requirement and the state's "unquestionably legitimate and highly important"
purpose
of conservation and preservation of diminishing sources of ground
60
water.
The issue which concerned New Mexico in El Paso I, however, was
whether of not, through state regulation, the flow of groundwater out of
51. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982).
52. 563 F. Supp. at 390.
53. 458 U.S. at 944. (The statute attacked in Sporhase provided that: Any person, firm, city,
village, municipal corporation or any other entity intending to withdraw ground water
from any well as pit located in the State of Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the Department of Water Resources for a permit to do so. If the
Director of Water Resources finds that the withdrawalof the ground water requested is
reasonable,is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit ifthe state in which the
water is to be used grants reciprocalrights to withdrawand transportgroundwaterfrom
that state for use in the State of Nebraska. (Emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 955-57.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 957.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 957-58.
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state could be restricted solely for economic reasons. The district court in
El Paso I answered this question in the negative. Sporhase, however, appears to allow such discrimination.
In Sporhase, Mr. Justice Stevens expressed the Court's reluctance to
interfere with a state's regulatory scheme absent a mandate from Congress.6 1 He stated that "in the absence of a contrary view expressed by
Congress, we are reluctant to condemn as unreasonable measures taken by
a state to conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital resource in
times of severe shortage. Our reluctance stems from the "confluence of
[several] realities. '62 The "realities" identified by the Court were:
a) A state may regulate the use of water in times of shortage for
the purpose of protecting the health and safety of its citizens;
b) From equitable apportionment cases and interstate compacts
there has risen an expectation that states may restrict water
within their borders;
c) A states claim to public ownership of water may support a
limited preference in its own citizens in the utilization of the
water; and,
d) Water which is the result of a state's conservation efforts is
similar to a good that is publicly produced and a state may
favor its
citizens in the utilization of this water in times of shor63
tage.
Of the four "realities" or, more appropriately, considerations, listed by the
Court, the third affords a state the best opportunity to protect the
economic interests of its citizens through regulation. Under this "limited
preference," a state should be able to restrict the export of ground water
for economic reasons.
Sporhase supports such a conclusion. After mentioning the "limited
preference," the Court cited the case of Hicklin v. Orbeck.64 Hicklin involved an Alaskan program which required that jobs relating to the exploitation
of oil and gas resources on state owned land be first offered to Alaska
residents. Even though the validity of this hiring program was attacked
under the privileges and immunities clause, Mr. Justice Brennan referred
to commerce precedents.6 5 The cases he referred to in deciding Hicklin
were West v. Kansas Natural Gas,66 Pennsylvaniav. West Virginia,6 7 and
Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel.6 Each of these cases involved attempts by
the states to regulate the use of natural resources for the economic benefit
of the state's citizens. Even though these cases found the state regulations
unconstitutional under the commerce clause, Mr. Justice Brennan felt
these three cases established the proposition that the "commerce clause
circumscribes a state's ability to prefer its own citizens in the utilization of
61. Id. at 956.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 956-57.
64. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
65. Id. at 531-34.
66. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
67. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
68. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
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natural resources found within its borders .. . ."69 Additionally in the
Hicklin case, Mr. Justice Brennan spoke of FosterPackingas limiting "the
extent to which a state's purported ownership of certain resources could
serve as a justification for the state's economic discrimination in favor of
residents." 7 0 Mr. Justice Brennan's comments in Hicklin thus indicate that
a state can prefer its citizens in the use of a natural resource and that this
preference can be motivated by economic reasons. The commerce clause
does not prohibit economic preferences, it only limits the extent of the
preference. Under Hicklin a state may, for economic reasons alone, prefer
its own citizens in the utilization of a natural resource as long as this
preference does not impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Additionally, the conclusion can be drawn from the Hicklin opinion
that under certain circumstances, a state's "purported" ownership of a
natural resource can permit the state to favor its own citizens. It is for this
reason that the "fiction" of state ownership of resources is "not without
significance" and relevant to a commerce clause inquiry. 7 ' By citing
Hicklin as authority for the "limited preference" in Sporhase, the Supreme
Court has indicated that a state can favor its own citizens in the use of a
resource for economic purposes. The court in El PasoI erred when it indicated that a state can only restrict the export of ground water in an
amount necessary to protect the health and safety of its citizens.
A question related to this "limited preference" has to do with the extent of the preference. In other words, how great is the area "circumscribed" by the commerce clause? The cases Mr. Justice Brennan mentioned in
Hicklin dealt with natural gas and shrimp, both of which are natural
resources. In addition, in FosterPacking the state was claiming an ownership interest in the shrimp caught in Louisiana's coastal waters. 72 In
Sporhase, the resource in question was ground water. Nebraska's claim to
public ownership of ground water, in the Court's opinion, "[was] logically
more substantial than claims to public ownership of other natural
resources."17 3 This statement by Mr. Justice Stevens in Sporhase reduces
the weight that is to be attached to the commerce clause limitations in
West, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, and Foster Packing. The limited
preference a state can exercise in favor of its own citizens is therefore
greater when ground water is involved. In addition, it appears quite
unreasonable to argue that this limited preference is only for health and
safety purposes since that need is adequately addressed in the first "reality" mentioned in Sporhase. The limited preference is intended to provide a
state's citizens with an economic benefit. For the reasons mentioned above
it is clear that a state can regulate the export of ground water so as to favor
its own citizens, even if for purely economic reasons. Under Sporhase and
the commerce clause, a state can restrict the export of ground water for
economic reasons. The extent of this preference has yet to be addressed by
the Court.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

437 U.S. 518, 533 (1978). (Emphasis added).
Id.
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
278 U.S. at 11.
458 U.S. at 956-57.
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Should the Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment Apply to Ground Water?
The district court's decision in El Paso I has created an unusual situation in the allocation of water among states. If the district court's decision
is correct, underground water can be removed by other states while the
state from which the water is being removed is unable to protect any
economic interest it may have in the water. But if the water involved flows
across the surface of the land, the state is able to protect its economic interests through an equitable apportionment proceeding." 4 Under the facts
of the principal case the disparity is especially striking because the ground
water is hydrologically related to the surface waters of the Rio Grande.7 5
There is a physical "link" between the river and the aquifer. Additionally,
the aquifer underlies portions of several states.7 6 From a practical standpoint there is no reason to treat ground water any differently from surface
waters of interstate streams. According to the district court's interpretation of Sporhase, the state could not protect its economic interests if the
water is to be pumped from underground, but could if the water happened
to be in an interstate stream.
EL PASO

I-THE CASE ON APPEAL

New Mexico appealed the district court's decision in El Paso I. While
the case was on appeal the New Mexico Legislature repealed the embargo
statute. In place of the embargo statute the Legislature enacted section
72-12B-1 (Senate Bill 295) of the New Mexico Statutes" which provides for
the movement of ground water out of the state.78 The statute establishes a
procedure for applying for permits to remove water from the state. In
order for an application to be approved, the State Engineer must find that
"the applicant's withdrawal and transportation of water for use outside the
state would not impair existing water rights, is not contrary to the conservation of water within the state and is not otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare of the citizens of New Mexico."7 9 The statute also lists
criteria that the State Engineer shall consider (but is not limited to) in
reaching his decision as to grant or deny permission to appropriate water.80
After the new statute was enacted, New Mexico moved in the appellate
court to have the case remanded to the district court with instructions to
dismiss the case as moot.8 ' New Mexico contended that the new statute
mooted any controversy that existed between the parties.8 2 El Paso opposed the motion to dismiss on the grounds that, first, Senate Bill 295 did not
74. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1931). (In apportioning the waters of interstate
streams the United States Supreme Court applies the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Colorado v. New Mexico, U.S. -,
103 S.Ct. 539, 545 (1982). Equitable apportionment is a doctrine of federal common law and it is a "flexible doctrine which calls
for the exercise of informed judgment on consideration of many factors to secure a just
and equitable allocation." Id.).
75. 563 F. Supp. at 384.
76. Id. at 380.
77. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (Supp. 1983).
78. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(BX(G) (Supp. 1983).
79. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(C) (Supp. 1983).
80. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(D) (Supp. 1983).
81. Motion to Dismiss and Suggestion of Mootness, City of El Paso v. Reynolds, No. 83-1350
(10th Cir., 1983).
82. Id. at 2-3.
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moot the issue of the State Engineer's interpretation of the state constitution as calling for an embargo; second, the bill merely restated the existing
embargo policy; third, New Mexico had not abandoned its embargo policy;
and fourth, the bill did not moot the issue of whether the Rio Grande Compact allocated ground water hydrologically related to the Rio Grande. 8 The
appellate court, in an unpublished order and judgment, vacated the district
court's decision in El PasoI and remanded the case for such "further proceedings as are deemed necessary and appropriate" (El Paso II).84

EL PASO II-CONSITUTIONALITY OF SENATE BILL

295

The district court in El Paso 1I will have to determine the constitutionality of Senate Bill 295. After the new law was enacted, El Paso moved
in the district court to have the decision in El Paso I amended to declare
Senate Bill 295 unconstitutional.85 It appears the district court agreed with
El Paso because the record on appeal contains an unsigned order declaring
sections 1(C), 1(D) and 5 unconstitutional.8 6 If this unsigned order is indicative of the district court's view of the constitutionality of Senate Bill
295, the district court will err again in its interpretation of Sporhase,
because the New Mexico statute is very similar to those portions of the
Nebraska statute in Sporhase which the Court found not to impermissibly
burden interstate commerce. 87 Both statutes vest discretionary authority
in a state official to decide whether permits for the export of groundwater
should be granted.88 Both statutes establish conditions upon which the
state official must base his decision. Both require that the amount of water
83. Brief Opposing Appellant's Motion to Dismiss the Case as Moot at 2, City of El Paso v.
Reynolds, No. 83-1350 (10th Cir., 1983).
84. Order and Judgment at 3, City of El Paso v. Reynolds, No. 83-1350 (10th Cir., 1983).
85. Motion to Modify Final Judgment at 4, City of El Paso v. Reynolds, No. 83-1350 (10th
Cir., 1983).
86. Section 1(C) reads:
In order to approve an application under this act, the State Engineer must find
that the applicant's withdrawal and transportation of water for use outside the
state would not impair existing water rights, is not contrary to the conservation of water within the state and is not otherwise detrimental to the public
welfare of the citizens of New Mexico. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(C)
(Supp. 1983).
Section 1(D) reads:
In acting upon an application under this act, the State Engineer shall consider,
but not be limited to, the following factors:
(1) the supply of water available to the state of New Mexico;
(2) water demands of the state of New Mexico;
(3) whether there are water shortages within the state of New Mexico;
(4) whether the water that is the subject of application could feasibly be
transported to alleviate water shortages in the state of New Mexico;
(5) the supply and sources of water available to the applicant in the state
where the applicant intends to use the water; and
(6) the demands placed on the applicant's supply in the state where the applicant intends to use the water.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(D) (Supp. 1983).
Section 5 of Senate Bill 295 amended New Mexico Stat. Ann. § 72-12-20 (1978) to read
"WHEN APPROPRIATION WITHOUT PERMIT ALLOWED. No permit and license to
appropriate underground waters for in-state use shall be required except in basins
declared by the State Engineer to have reasonably ascertainable boundaries." See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-12-20 (Supp. 1983).
87. See supra notes 3, 55-58 and accompanying text.
88. Id.
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withdrawn be reasonable, that the withdrawal not be contrary to the purpose of conservation of ground water, and that the withdrawal not be
otherwise detrimental to the public.8 9 In Sporhase, the Court found that
these conditions did not impermissibly burden interstate commerce. 90
The constitutional problem with the statute in Sporhase was its
reciprocity requirement. 91 No such requirement exists in Senate Bill 295.
Since Senate Bill 295 Section 1(C) parallels the valid portions of the statute
in Sporhase, the district court will be committing error if it declares that
section unconstitutional. Section 1(D) merely establishes a list of factors for
the State Engineer to consider in reaching his decision.9 2 If it is constitutionally permissible to allow the State Engineer to consider the public
welfare in his determining whether to grant an export permit it should not
be consitutionally
impermissible to require him to consider certain
93
factors.

As part of its police power the state has a duty to protect the health and
safety of its citizens.9 4 The state's police power also requires it to take steps
to protect and promote the health of its economy. 95 In Chicago,Burlington
and Quincy Railway Co. v. People of the State ofIllinois,the Supreme Court
held that "the police power of a state embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity as well as those
designed to promote the public health, the public morals, or the public safety." 96 The availability of water in adequate supplies is crucial not only to
the health and safety of a state's inhabitants but also to the viability of its
economy. The California Supreme Court eloquently summarized the impor97
tance of water to a state in Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara:
The conservation of other natural resources are of importance, but
the conservation of the waters of the state is of transcendent importance. Its waters are the very life blood of its existence. The
police power is an attribute of sovereignty and is founded on the
duty of the state to protect its citizens and provide for the safety,
good order, and well being of society.
By exercising its police power for economic reasons, the state can take
advantage of the "limited preference" approved in Sporhase. State police
power includes efforts to promote the "general prosperity," and to meet
this end, states must be able to regulate the exploitation of ground water.
It is through the application of legislative enactments such as Senate Bill
295 that a state could carry out these duties.
Also, under Senate Bill 295 it is not the consitutionality of the statute
which should be questioned but rather the constitutionality of the State
Engineer's actions. If any burden is imposed on interstate commerce it will
89. Id.

90. 458 U.S. at 957.
91. Id.

92. N.M.

STAT.

ANN.§ 72-12B-1(D) (Supp. 1983).

93. See aupra note 86.

94. Chicago, B. and Q. Ry. Co. v. llinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1905).
95. Id.
96. Id.

97. 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (1933).
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be the result of the State Engineer's decision and not the statute. The
statute does not preclude the export of water out of the state. In fact,
Senate Bill 295 expressly recognize that under appropriate conditions export should be allowed.98 Any New Mexico ground water that is kept out of
interstate commerce will be the result of the State Engineer's decision.
In determining the validity of the State Engineer's decision the courts
will apply the test from Pike v. Bruce Church.99 The United States Supreme
Court in Sporhase applied the same test in analyzing an almost identical
statute.10 0 In Sporhase Mr. Justice Stevens quoted the Pike test as: 10 1
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.
Hicklin recognized that discrimination against interstate commerce in a
natural resource for economic reasons can, under certain circumstances,
constitute a "legitimate local purpose." Also, under Chicago, Burlington
and Quincy Railway Co., promoting the "general prosperity" can constitute a legitimate purpose. 10 2 Once a legitimate purpose is found, the
court will then weigh the extent of the burden imposed on interstate commerce against the local benefits to be derived. The State Engineer, under
this test, will be able to adequately represent the state's interests in the
water. If the court finds the amount of groundwater that is held back from
interstate commerce for the "limited preference" results in an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, it will declare the State Engineer's
decision to be unconstitutional.
Senate Bill 295, as it is written, does not constitute an impermissible
burden on interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION

The New Mexico embargo statute was clearly an unconstitutional imposition on interstate commerce. The district court in El PasoI was correct
in declaring the embargo statute unconstitutional but it interpreted
Sporhase too narrowly when it held that a state could not favor its citizens
in the use of water in excess of the amount necessary for health and safety
purposes. The Court in Sporhase permitted the states to show a limited
preference for its citizens in the use of water for economic purposes.
98. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(A) and (B) (Supp. 1983).
99. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
100. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982).
101. Id.
102. Chicago, B. and Q. Ry. Co. v. llinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1905).
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The Court in Sporhase also found portions of a statute similar to Senate
Bill 295 valid under the commerce clause. A reciprocity requirement was
the problem with the statute in Sporhase but no such requirement is present in Senate Bill 295. By combining the Pike v. Bruce Church commerce
clause test with a statute similar to the one in Sporhase or Senate Bill 295
and the limited preference for economic interests, the Supreme Court has
helped create a means for allocating ground water among states which is
closely related in substance to the doctrine of equitable apportionment.
This development is needed because there is little reason to treat ground
water differently from surface water, especially when they both possess
"multistate character[s]. '"103
Senate Bill 295 and Sporhase provide, at best, only temporary relief for
a problem which will continue to fester and grow as the region continues to
develop and the resource grows even scarcer. What is needed is a Rio
Grande Compact of 1984. The new compact should allocate both surface
and ground water and should be renegotiated periodically. The new compact should be the product of the several states in the region working
together to reach a mutually beneficial solution and not the result of
needless interference or meddling on the part of Congress or some federal
administrative agency.
ALGIRDAS MYKOLAS LIEPAS

103. SPORHASE V. NEBRAsKA, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
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